- Restrictions
- Pipeline requirements
- Merge request with multiple pipelines
- Merge request approval policy editor
- Merge request approval policies schema
- Merge request approval policy schema
-
scan_finding
rule type -
license_finding
rule type -
any_merge_request
rule type -
require_approval
action type -
send_bot_message
action type -
approval_settings
-
fallback_behavior
- Policy scope schema
- Example security merge request approval policies project
- Example for Merge Request Approval Policy editor
- Understanding merge request approval policy approvals
- Troubleshooting
Merge request approval policies
- Group-level scan result policies introduced in GitLab 15.6.
- Scan result policies feature was renamed to merge request approval policies in GitLab 16.9.
Use merge request approval policies to enforce project-level settings and approval rules based on scan results. For example, one type of scan result policy is a security approval policy that allows approval to be required based on the findings of one or more security scan jobs. Merge request approval policies are evaluated after a CI scanning job is fully executed and both vulnerability and license type policies are evaluated based on the job artifact reports that are published in the completed pipeline.
The following video gives you an overview of GitLab merge request approval policies (previously scan result policies):
Restrictions
- You can enforce merge request approval policies only on protected target branches.
- You can assign a maximum of five rules to each policy.
- You can assign a maximum of five merge request approval policies to each security policy project.
- Policies created for a group or subgroup can take some time to apply to all the merge requests in the group.
- Merge request approval policies do not check the integrity or authenticity of the scan results generated in the artifact reports.
- A merge request approval policy is evaluated according to its rules. By default, if the rules are
invalid, or can’t be evaluated, approval is required. You can change this behavior with the
fallback_behavior
field.
Pipeline requirements
A merge request approval policy is enforced according to the outcome of the pipeline. Consider the following when implementing a merge request approval policy:
- A merge request approval policy evaluates completed pipeline jobs, ignoring manual jobs. When the manual jobs are run, the policy re-evaluates the merge request’s jobs.
- For a merge request approval policy that evaluates the results of security scanners, all specified scanners must have output a security report. If not, approvals are enforced to minimize the risk of vulnerabilities being introduced.
- The pipeline must produce artifacts for all enabled scanners, for both the source and target branches. If not, there’s no basis for comparison and so the policy can’t be evaluated. You should use a scan execution policy to enforce this requirement.
- Policy evaluation depends on a successful and completed merge base pipeline. If the merge base pipeline is skipped, merge requests with the merge base pipeline are blocked.
- Security scanners specified in a policy must be configured and enabled in the projects on which the policy is enforced. If not, the merge request approval policy cannot be evaluated and the corresponding approvals are required.
Merge request with multiple pipelines
-
Introduced in GitLab 16.2 with a flag named
multi_pipeline_scan_result_policies
. Disabled by default. -
Generally available in GitLab 16.3. Feature flag
multi_pipeline_scan_result_policies
removed. - Support for parent-child pipelines introduced in GitLab 16.11 with a flag named
approval_policy_parent_child_pipeline
. Disabled by default. - Enabled on GitLab.com in GitLab 17.0.
-
Generally available in GitLab 17.1. Feature flag
approval_policy_parent_child_pipeline
removed.
A project can have multiple pipeline types configured. A single commit can initiate multiple pipelines, each of which may contain a security scan.
- In GitLab 16.3 and later, the results of all completed pipelines for the latest commit in the merge request’s source and target branch are evaluated and used to enforce the merge request approval policy. On-demand DAST pipelines are not considered.
- In GitLab 16.2 and earlier, only the results of the latest completed pipeline were evaluated when enforcing merge request approval policies.
If a project uses merge request pipelines, you must use the latest
security templates so that the security scanning jobs are present in the pipeline.
For more information see Use security scanning tools with merge request pipelines.
Merge request approval policy editor
- Enabled by default in GitLab 15.6.
Once your policy is complete, save it by selecting Configure with a merge request at the bottom of the editor. This redirects you to the merge request on the project’s configured security policy project. If a security policy project doesn’t link to your project, GitLab creates such a project for you. Existing policies can also be removed from the editor interface by selecting Delete policy at the bottom of the editor.
Most policy changes take effect as soon as the merge request is merged. Any changes that do not go through a merge request and are committed directly to the default branch may require up to 10 minutes before the policy changes take effect.
The policy editor supports YAML mode and rule mode.
Merge request approval policies schema
The YAML file with merge request approval policies consists of an array of objects matching the merge request approval
policy schema nested under the approval_policy
key. You can configure a maximum of five policies under the approval_policy
key.
scan_result_policy
key. Until GitLab 17.0, policies can be
defined under both keys. Starting from GitLab 17.0, only approval_policy
key is supported.When you save a new policy, GitLab validates its contents against this JSON schema. If you’re not familiar with how to read JSON schemas, the following sections and tables provide an alternative.
Field | Type | Required | Description |
---|---|---|---|
approval_policy
|
array of merge request approval policy objects
|
true | List of merge request approval policies (maximum 5). |
Merge request approval policy schema
- The
approval_settings
fields were introduced in GitLab 16.4 with flags namedscan_result_policies_block_unprotecting_branches
,scan_result_any_merge_request
, orscan_result_policies_block_force_push
. See theapproval_settings
section below for more information.
Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
name
|
string
|
true | Name of the policy. Maximum of 255 characters. | |
description
|
string
|
false | Description of the policy. | |
enabled
|
boolean
|
true |
true , false
|
Flag to enable (true ) or disable (false ) the policy.
|
rules
|
array of rules
|
true | List of rules that the policy applies. | |
actions
|
array of actions
|
false | List of actions that the policy enforces. | |
approval_settings
|
object
|
false | Project settings that the policy overrides. | |
fallback_behavior
|
object
|
false | Settings that affect invalid or unenforceable rules. | |
policy_scope
|
object of policy_scope
|
false | Defines the scope of the policy based on the projects, groups, or compliance framework labels you specify. |
scan_finding
rule type
- The merge request approval policy field
vulnerability_attributes
was introduced in GitLab 16.2 with a flag namedenforce_vulnerability_attributes_rules
. Generally available in GitLab 16.3. Feature flag removed. - The merge request approval policy field
vulnerability_age
was introduced in GitLab 16.2. - The
branch_exceptions
field was introduced in GitLab 16.3 with a flag namedsecurity_policies_branch_exceptions
. Generally available in GitLab 16.5. Feature flag removed. - The
vulnerability_states
optionnewly_detected
was removed in GitLab 17.0 and the optionsnew_needs_triage
andnew_dismissed
were added to replace it.
This rule enforces the defined actions based on security scan findings.
Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
type
|
string
|
true |
scan_finding
|
The rule’s type. |
branches
|
array of string
|
true if branch_type field does not exist
|
[] or the branch’s name
|
Applicable only to protected target branches. An empty array, [] , applies the rule to all protected target branches. Cannot be used with the branch_type field.
|
branch_type
|
string
|
true if branches field does not exist
|
default or protected
|
The types of protected branches the given policy applies to. Cannot be used with the branches field. Default branches must also be protected .
|
branch_exceptions
|
array of string
|
false | Names of branches | Branches to exclude from this rule. |
scanners
|
array of string
|
true |
sast , secret_detection , dependency_scanning , container_scanning , dast , coverage_fuzzing , api_fuzzing
|
The security scanners for this rule to consider. sast includes results from both SAST and SAST IaC scanners.
|
vulnerabilities_allowed
|
integer
|
true | Greater than or equal to zero | Number of vulnerabilities allowed before this rule is considered. |
severity_levels
|
array of string
|
true |
info , unknown , low , medium , high , critical
|
The severity levels for this rule to consider. |
vulnerability_states
|
array of string
|
true |
[] or detected , confirmed , resolved , dismissed , new_needs_triage , new_dismissed
|
All vulnerabilities fall into two categories: Newly Detected Vulnerabilities - Vulnerabilities identified in the merge request branch itself but that do not currently exist on the MR’s target branch. This policy option requires a pipeline to complete before the rule is evaluated so that it knows whether vulnerabilities are newly detected or not. Merge requests are blocked until the pipeline and necessary security scans are complete. The new_needs_triage option considers the status• Detected The new_dismissed option considers the status• Dismissed Pre-Existing Vulnerabilities - these policy options are evaluated immediately and do not require a pipeline complete as they consider only vulnerabilities previously detected in the default branch. • Detected - the policy looks for vulnerabilities in the detected state.• Confirmed - the policy looks for vulnerabilities in the confirmed state.• Dismissed - the policy looks for vulnerabilities in the dismissed state.• Resolved - the policy looks for vulnerabilities in the resolved state. An empty array, [] , covers the same statuses as ['new_needs_triage', 'new_dismissed'] .
|
vulnerability_attributes
|
object
|
false |
{false_positive: boolean, fix_available: boolean}
|
All vulnerability findings are considered by default. But filters can be applied for attributes to consider only vulnerability findings: • With a fix available ( fix_available: true )• With no fix available ( fix_available: false )• That are false positive ( false_positive: true )• That are not false positive ( false_positive: false )• Or a combination of both. For example ( fix_available: true, false_positive: false )
|
vulnerability_age
|
object
|
false | N/A | Filter pre-existing vulnerability findings by age. A vulnerability’s age is calculated as the time since it was detected in the project. The criteria are operator , value , and interval .- The operator criterion specifies if the age comparison used is older than (greater_than ) or younger than (less_than ).- The value criterion specifies the numeric value representing the vulnerability’s age.- The interval criterion specifies the unit of measure of the vulnerability’s age: day , week , month , or year .Example: operator: greater_than , value: 30 , interval: day .
|
license_finding
rule type
-
Introduced in GitLab 15.9 with a flag named
license_scanning_policies
. -
Generally available in GitLab 15.11. Feature flag
license_scanning_policies
removed. - The
branch_exceptions
field was introduced in GitLab 16.3 with a flag namedsecurity_policies_branch_exceptions
. Enabled by default. Generally available in GitLab 16.5. Feature flag removed.
This rule enforces the defined actions based on license findings.
Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
type
|
string
|
true |
license_finding
|
The rule’s type. |
branches
|
array of string
|
true if branch_type field does not exist
|
[] or the branch’s name
|
Applicable only to protected target branches. An empty array, [] , applies the rule to all protected target branches. Cannot be used with the branch_type field.
|
branch_type
|
string
|
true if branches field does not exist
|
default or protected
|
The types of protected branches the given policy applies to. Cannot be used with the branches field. Default branches must also be protected .
|
branch_exceptions
|
array of string
|
false | Names of branches | Branches to exclude from this rule. |
match_on_inclusion_license
|
boolean
|
true |
true , false
|
Whether the rule matches inclusion or exclusion of licenses listed in license_types .
|
license_types
|
array of string
|
true | license types |
SPDX license names to match on, for example Affero General Public License v1.0 or MIT License .
|
license_states
|
array of string
|
true |
newly_detected , detected
|
Whether to match newly detected and/or previously detected licenses. The newly_detected state triggers approval when either a new package is introduced or when a new license for an existing package is detected.
|
any_merge_request
rule type
- The
branch_exceptions
field was introduced in GitLab 16.3 with a flag namedsecurity_policies_branch_exceptions
. Enabled by default. Generally available in GitLab 16.5. Feature flag removed. - The
any_merge_request
rule type was introduced in GitLab 16.4. Enabled by default. Generally available in GitLab 16.6. Feature flag removed.
This rule enforces the defined actions for any merge request based on the commits signature.
Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
type
|
string
|
true |
any_merge_request
|
The rule’s type. |
branches
|
array of string
|
true if branch_type field does not exist
|
[] or the branch’s name
|
Applicable only to protected target branches. An empty array, [] , applies the rule to all protected target branches. Cannot be used with the branch_type field.
|
branch_type
|
string
|
true if branches field does not exist
|
default or protected
|
The types of protected branches the given policy applies to. Cannot be used with the branches field. Default branches must also be protected .
|
branch_exceptions
|
array of string
|
false | Names of branches | Branches to exclude from this rule. |
commits
|
string
|
true |
any , unsigned
|
Whether the rule matches for any commits, or only if unsigned commits are detected in the merge request. |
require_approval
action type
This action sets an approval rule to be required when conditions are met for at least one rule in the defined policy.
Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
type
|
string
|
true |
require_approval
|
The action’s type. |
approvals_required
|
integer
|
true | Greater than or equal to zero | The number of MR approvals required. |
user_approvers
|
array of string
|
false | Username of one of more users | The users to consider as approvers. Users must have access to the project to be eligible to approve. |
user_approvers_ids
|
array of integer
|
false | ID of one of more users | The IDs of users to consider as approvers. Users must have access to the project to be eligible to approve. |
group_approvers
|
array of string
|
false | Path of one of more groups | The groups to consider as approvers. Users with direct membership in the group are eligible to approve. |
group_approvers_ids
|
array of integer
|
false | ID of one of more groups | The IDs of groups to consider as approvers. Users with direct membership in the group are eligible to approve. |
role_approvers
|
array of string
|
false | One or more roles (for example: owner , maintainer )
|
The roles to consider as approvers that are eligible to approve. |
send_bot_message
action type
- The
send_bot_message
action type was introduced for projects in GitLab 16.11 with a flag namedapproval_policy_disable_bot_comment
. Disabled by default. - Enabled on self-managed, and GitLab Dedicated in GitLab 17.0.
-
Generally available in GitLab 17.3. Feature flag
approval_policy_disable_bot_comment
removed. - The
send_bot_message
action type was introduced for groups in GitLab 17.2 with a flag namedapproval_policy_disable_bot_comment_group
. Disabled by default. - Enabled on self-managed, and GitLab Dedicated in GitLab 17.2.
-
Generally available in GitLab 17.3. Feature flag
approval_policy_disable_bot_comment_group
removed.
This action enables configuration of the bot message in merge requests when policy violations are detected.
If the action is not specified, the bot message is enabled by default. If there are multiple policies defined,
the bot message is sent as long as at least one of those policies has the send_bot_message
action is enabled.
Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
type
|
string
|
true |
send_bot_message
|
The action’s type. |
enabled
|
boolean
|
true |
true , false
|
Whether a bot message should be created when policy violations are detected. Default: true
|
Example bot messages
approval_settings
- The
block_group_branch_modification
field was introduced in GitLab 16.8 with flag namedscan_result_policy_block_group_branch_modification
. Disabled by default. - The
block_unprotecting_branches
field was introduced in GitLab 16.4 with flag namedscan_result_policy_settings
. Disabled by default. - The
scan_result_policy_settings
feature flag was replaced by thescan_result_policies_block_unprotecting_branches
feature flag in 16.4. - The
block_unprotecting_branches
field was replaced byblock_branch_modification
field in GitLab 16.7. - The above field was enabled on GitLab.com in GitLab 16.7.
- The above field was enabled on self-managed in GitLab 16.7.
- The
prevent_approval_by_author
,prevent_approval_by_commit_author
,remove_approvals_with_new_commit
, andrequire_password_to_approve
fields were introduced in GitLab 16.4 with flag namedscan_result_any_merge_request
. Disabled by default. - The above fields were enabled on GitLab.com in GitLab 16.6.
- The above fields were enabled on self-managed in GitLab 16.7.
- Feature flag
scan_result_any_merge_request
was removed in GitLab 16.8. - The
prevent_pushing_and_force_pushing
field was introduced in GitLab 16.4 with flag namedscan_result_policies_block_force_push
. Disabled by default. - The above field was enabled on GitLab.com in GitLab 16.6.
- The above field was enabled on self-managed in GitLab 16.7.
- Feature flag
scan_result_policies_block_force_push
was removed in GitLab 16.8.
block_branch_modification
field is available. To hide the feature, an administrator can disable the feature flag named scan_result_policies_block_unprotecting_branches
. On GitLab.com and GitLab Dedicated, this feature is available.The settings set in the policy overwrite settings in the project.
Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Applicable rule type | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
block_branch_modification
|
boolean
|
false |
true , false
|
All | When enabled, prevents a user from removing a branch from the protected branches list, deleting a protected branch, or changing the default branch if that branch is included in the security policy. This ensures users cannot remove protection status from a branch to merge vulnerable code. Enforced based on branches , branch_type and policy_scope and regardless of detected vulnerabilities.
|
block_group_branch_modification
|
boolean or object
|
false |
true , false , { enabled: boolean, exceptions: [string] }
|
All | When enabled, prevents a user from removing group-level protected branches on every group the policy applies to. If block_branch_modification is true , implicitly defaults to true . Enforced based on branches , branch_type and policy_scope and regardless of detected vulnerabilities.
|
prevent_approval_by_author
|
boolean
|
false |
true , false
|
Any merge request
|
When enabled, merge request authors cannot approve their own MRs. This ensures code authors cannot introduce vulnerabilities and approve code to merge. |
prevent_approval_by_commit_author
|
boolean
|
false |
true , false
|
Any merge request
|
When enabled, users who have contributed code to the MR are ineligible for approval. This ensures code committers cannot introduce vulnerabilities and approve code to merge. |
remove_approvals_with_new_commit
|
boolean
|
false |
true , false
|
Any merge request
|
When enabled, if an MR receives all necessary approvals to merge, but then a new commit is added, new approvals are required. This ensures new commits that may include vulnerabilities cannot be introduced. |
require_password_to_approve
|
boolean
|
false |
true , false
|
Any merge request
|
When enabled, there will be password confirmation on approvals. Password confirmation adds an extra layer of security. |
prevent_pushing_and_force_pushing
|
boolean
|
false |
true , false
|
All | When enabled, prevents users from pushing and force pushing to a protected branch if that branch is included in the security policy. This ensures users do not bypass the merge request process to add vulnerable code to a branch. |
fallback_behavior
- The
fallback_behavior
field was introduced in GitLab 17.0 with a flag namedsecurity_scan_result_policies_unblock_fail_open_approval_rules
. Disabled by default. - The
fallback_behavior
field was enabled on GitLab.com, self-managed, and GitLab Dedicated in GitLab 17.0.
fallback_behavior
field is available. To hide the feature, an administrator can disable the feature flag named security_scan_result_policies_unblock_fail_open_approval_rules
. On GitLab.com and GitLab Dedicated, this feature is available.Field | Type | Required | Possible values | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
fail
|
string
|
false |
open or closed
|
closed (default): Invalid or unenforceable rules of a policy require approval. open : Invalid or unenforceable rules of a policy do not require approval.
|
Policy scope schema
To customize policy enforcement, you can define a policy’s scope to either include or exclude specified projects, groups, or compliance framework labels. For more details, see Scope.
Example security merge request approval policies project
You can use this example in a .gitlab/security-policies/policy.yml
file stored in a
security policy project:
---
approval_policy:
- name: critical vulnerability CS approvals
description: critical severity level only for container scanning
enabled: true
rules:
- type: scan_finding
branches:
- main
scanners:
- container_scanning
vulnerabilities_allowed: 0
severity_levels:
- critical
vulnerability_states: []
vulnerability_attributes:
false_positive: true
fix_available: true
actions:
- type: require_approval
approvals_required: 1
user_approvers:
- adalberto.dare
- name: secondary CS approvals
description: secondary only for container scanning
enabled: true
rules:
- type: scan_finding
branches:
- main
scanners:
- container_scanning
vulnerabilities_allowed: 1
severity_levels:
- low
- unknown
vulnerability_states:
- detected
vulnerability_age:
operator: greater_than
value: 30
interval: day
actions:
- type: require_approval
approvals_required: 1
role_approvers:
- owner
In this example:
- Every MR that contains new
critical
vulnerabilities identified by container scanning requires one approval fromalberto.dare
. - Every MR that contains more than one preexisting
low
orunknown
vulnerability older than 30 days identified by container scanning requires one approval from a project member with the Owner role.
Example for Merge Request Approval Policy editor
You can use this example in the YAML mode of the Merge Request Approval Policy editor. It corresponds to a single object from the previous example:
type: approval_policy
name: critical vulnerability CS approvals
description: critical severity level only for container scanning
enabled: true
rules:
- type: scan_finding
branches:
- main
scanners:
- container_scanning
vulnerabilities_allowed: 1
severity_levels:
- critical
vulnerability_states: []
actions:
- type: require_approval
approvals_required: 1
user_approvers:
- adalberto.dare
Understanding merge request approval policy approvals
- The branch comparison logic for
scan_finding
was changed in GitLab 16.8 with a flag namedscan_result_policy_merge_base_pipeline
. Disabled by default. -
Generally available in GitLab 16.9. Feature flag
scan_result_policy_merge_base_pipeline
removed.
Scope of merge request approval policy comparison
- To determine when approval is required on a merge request, we compare completed pipelines for each supported pipeline source for the source and target branch (for example,
feature
/main
). This ensures the most comprehensive evaluation of scan results. - For the source branch, the comparison pipelines are all completed pipelines for each supported pipeline source for the latest commit in the source branch.
- If the merge request approval policy looks only for the newly detected states (
new_needs_triage
&new_dismissed
), the comparison is performed against all the supported pipeline sources in the common ancestor between the source and the target branch. An exception is when using Merged Results pipelines, in which case the comparison is done against the tip of the MR’s target branch. - If the merge request approval policy looks for pre-existing states (
detected
,confirmed
,resolved
,dismissed
), the comparison is always done against the tip of the default branch (for example,main
). - If the merge request approval policy looks for a combination of new and pre-existing vulnerabilty states, the comparison is done against the common ancestor of the source and target branches.
- Merge request approval policies considers all supported pipeline sources (based on the
CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE
variable) when comparing results from both the source and target branches when determining if a merge request requires approval. Pipelines with sourcewebide
are not supported. - In GitLab 16.11 and later, the child pipelines of each of the selected pipelines are also considered for comparison. This is available with a flag named
approval_policy_parent_child_pipeline
.
Accepting risk and ignoring vulnerabilities in future merge requests
For merge request approval policies that are scoped to newly detected findings(new_needs_triage
or new_dismissed
statuses), it’s important to understand the implications of this vulnerability state. A finding is considered newly detected if it exists on the merge request’s branch but not on the default branch. When a merge request whose branch contains newly detected findings is approved and merged, approvers are “accepting the risk” of those vulnerabilities. If one or more of the same vulnerabilities were detected after this time, their status would be detected
and so not be out of scope of a policy aimed at new_needs_triage
or new_dismissed
findings. For example:
- A merge request approval policy is created to block critical SAST findings. If a SAST finding for CVE-1234 is approved, future merge requests with the same violation will not require approval in the project.
When using license approval policies, the combination of project, component (dependency), and license are considered in the evaluation. If a license is approved as an exception, future merge requests don’t require approval for the same combination of project, component (dependency), and license. The component’s version is not be considered in this case. If a previously approved package is updated to a new version, approvers will not need to re-approve. For example:
- A license approval policy is created to block merge requests with newly detected licenses matching
AGPL-1.0
. A change is made in projectdemo
for componentosframework
that violates the policy. If approved and merged, future merge requests toosframework
in projectdemo
with the licenseAGPL-1.0
don’t require approval.
Multiple approvals
There are several situations where the merge request approval policy requires an additional approval step. For example:
-
The number of security jobs is reduced in the working branch and no longer matches the number of security jobs in the target branch. Users can’t skip the Scanning Result Policies by removing scanning jobs from the CI/CD configuration. Only the security scans that are configured in the merge request approval policy rules are checked for removal.
For example, consider a situation where the default branch pipeline has four security scans:
sast
,secret_detection
,container_scanning
, anddependency_scanning
. A merge request approval policy enforces two scanners:container_scanning
anddependency_scanning
. If an MR removes a scan that is configured in merge request approval policy,container_scanning
for example, an additional approval is required. - Someone stops a pipeline security job, and users can’t skip the security scan.
- A job in a merge request fails and is configured with
allow_failure: false
. As a result, the pipeline is in a blocked state. - A pipeline has a manual job that must run successfully for the entire pipeline to pass.
Managing scan findings used to evaluate approval requirements
Merge request approval policies evaluate the artifact reports generated by scanners in your pipelines after the pipeline has completed. Merge request approval policies focus on evaluating the results and determining approvals based on the scan result findings to identify potential risks, block merge requests, and require approval.
Merge request approval policies do not extend beyond that scope to reach into artifact files or scanners. Instead, we trust the results from artifact reports. This gives teams flexibility in managing their scan execution and supply chain, and customizing scan results generated in artifact reports (for example, to filter out false positives) if needed.
Lock file tampering, for example, is outside of the scope of security policy management, but may be mitigated through use of Code owners or external status checks. For more information, see issue 433029.
Filter out policy violations with the attributes “Fix Available” or “False Positive”
To avoid unnecessary approval requirements, these additional filters help ensure you only block MRs on the most actionable findings.
By setting fix_available
to false
in YAML, or is not and Fix Available in the policy editor, the finding is not considered a policy violation when the finding has a solution or remediation available. Solutions appear at the bottom of the vulnerability object under the heading Solution. Remediations appear as a Resolve with Merge Request button within the vulnerability object.
The Resolve with Merge Request button only appears when one of the following criteria is met:
- A SAST vulnerability is found in a project that is on the Ultimate Tier with GitLab Duo Enterprise.
- A container scanning vulnerability is found in a project that is on the Ultimate Tier in a job where
GIT_STRATEGY: fetch
has been set. Additionally, the vulnerability must have a package containing a fix that is available for the repositories enabled for the container image. - A dependency scanning vulnerability is found in a Node.js project that is managed by yarn and a fix is available. Additionally, the project must be on the Ultimate Tier and FIPS mode must be disabled for the instance.
Fix Available only applies to dependency scanning and container scanning.
By using the False Positive attribute, similarly, you can ignore findings detected by a policy by setting false_positive
to false
(or set attribute to Is not and False Positive in the policy editor).
The False Positive attribute only applies to findings detected by our Vulnerability Extraction Tool for SAST results.
Troubleshooting
Merge request rules widget shows a merge request approval policy is invalid or duplicated
On GitLab self-managed from 15.0 to 16.4, the most likely cause is that the project was exported from a group and imported into another, and had merge request approval policy rules. These rules are stored in a separate project to the one that was exported. As a result, the project contains policy rules that reference entities that don’t exist in the imported project’s group. The result is policy rules that are invalid, duplicated, or both.
To remove all invalid merge request approval policy rules from a GitLab instance, an administrator can run the following script in the Rails console.
Project.joins(:approval_rules).where(approval_rules: { report_type: %i[scan_finding license_scanning] }).where.not(approval_rules: { security_orchestration_policy_configuration_id: nil }).find_in_batches.flat_map do |batch|
batch.map do |project|
# Get projects and their configuration_ids for applicable project rules
[project, project.approval_rules.where(report_type: %i[scan_finding license_scanning]).pluck(:security_orchestration_policy_configuration_id).uniq]
end.uniq.map do |project, configuration_ids| # We take only unique combinations of project + configuration_ids
# If we find more configurations than what is available for the project, we take records with the extra configurations
[project, configuration_ids - project.all_security_orchestration_policy_configurations.pluck(:id)]
end.select { |_project, configuration_ids| configuration_ids.any? }
end.each do |project, configuration_ids|
# For each found pair project + ghost configuration, we remove these rules for a given project
Security::OrchestrationPolicyConfiguration.where(id: configuration_ids).each do |configuration|
configuration.delete_scan_finding_rules_for_project(project.id)
end
# Ensure we sync any potential rules from new group's policy
Security::ScanResultPolicies::SyncProjectWorker.perform_async(project.id)
end
Newly detected CVEs
When using new_needs_triage
and new_dismissed
, some findings may require approval when they are not introduced by the merge request (such as a new CVE on a related dependency). These findings will not be present within the MR widget, but will be highlighted in the policy bot comment and pipeline report.
Policies still have effect after policy.yml
was manually invalidated
In GitLab 17.2 and earlier, you may find that policies defined in a policy.yml
file are enforced,
even though the file was manually edited and no longer validates
against the policy schema. This issue occurs because of
a bug in the policy synchronization logic.
Potential symptoms include:
-
approval_settings
still block the removal of branch protections, block force-pushes or otherwise affect open merge requests. -
any_merge_request
policies still apply to open merge requests.
To resolve this you can:
- Manually edit the
policy.yml
file that defines the policy so that it becomes valid again. - Unassign and re-assign the security policy projects where the
policy.yml
file is stored.
Missing security scans
When using merge request approval policies, you may encounter situations where merge requests are blocked, including in new projects or when certain security scans are not executed. This behavior is by design to reduce the risk of introducing vulnerabilities into your system.
Example scenarios:
-
Missing scans on source or target branches
If security scans are missing on either the source or target branch, GitLab cannot effectively evaluate whether the merge request is introducing new vulnerabilities. In such cases, approval is required as a precautionary measure.
-
New projects
For new projects where security scans have not yet been set up or executed on the target branch, all merge requests require approval. This ensures that security checks are active from the project’s inception.
-
Projects with no files to scan
Even in projects that contain no files relevant to the selected security scans, the approval requirement is still enforced. This maintains consistent security practices across all projects.
-
First merge request
The very first merge request in a new project may be blocked if the default branch doesn’t have a security scan, even if the source branch has no vulnerabilities.
To resolve these issues:
- Ensure that all required security scans are configured and running successfully on both source and target branches.
- For new projects, set up and run the necessary security scans on the default branch before creating merge requests.
- Consider using scan execution policies or pipeline execution policies to ensure consistent execution of security scans across all branches.
- Consider using
fallback_behavior
withopen
to prevent invalid or unenforceable rules in a policy from requiring approval.
Support request for debugging of merge request approval policy
GitLab.com users may submit a support ticket titled “Merge request approval policy debugging”. Provide the following details:
- Group path, project path and optionally merge request ID
- Severity
- Current behavior
- Expected behavior
GitLab.com
Support teams will investigate logs (pubsub-sidekiq-inf-gprd*
) to identify the failure reason
. Below is an example response snippet from logs. You can use this query to find logs related to approvals: json.event.keyword: "update_approvals"
and json.project_path: "group-path/project-path"
. Optionally, you can further filter by the merge request identifier using json.merge_request_iid
:
"json": {
"project_path": "group-path/project-path",
"merge_request_iid": 2,
"missing_scans": [
"api_fuzzing"
],
"reason": "Scanner removed by MR",
"event": "update_approvals",
}
GitLab self-managed
Search for keywords such as the project-path
, api_fuzzing
, and merge_request
. Example: grep group-path/project-path
, and grep merge_request
. If you know the correlation ID you can search by correlation ID. For example, if the value of correlation_id
is 01HWN2NFABCEDFG, search for 01HWN2NFABCEDFG
.
Search in the following files:
-
/gitlab/gitlab-rails/production_json.log
-
/gitlab/sidekiq/current
Common failure reasons:
- Scanner removed by MR: Merge request approval policy expects that the scanners defined in the policy are present and that they successfully produce an artifact for comparison.